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THE CASE FOR CHEVRON DEFERENCE TO IMMIGRATION ADJUDICATIONS 
 
Patrick J. Glen 
 
ABSTRACT 
Chevron skepticism is in vogue in legal academia, as 
Professors Shoba Wadhia and Christopher Walker’s recent entry in 
the genre demonstrates.  They place their project within the broader 
academic trend of arguing for limitations on the application of 
deference to various administrative decisions, but their aim is 
ultimately narrower—to show that “this case against Chevron has 
* * * its greatest force when it comes to immigration.” 
The Professors are incorrect.  Immigration adjudication 
presents one of the strongest cases for deference to administrative 
adjudication.  This case is founded in the text of the statute itself and 
its myriad general and specific delegations of authority to the 
Attorney General, the expertise of the agency which has honed its 
interpretive enterprise through adjudicating tens of thousands of 
cases annually, and the ultimate political accountability of the 
agency head in immigration adjudication.  For these reasons, the 
Supreme Court has applied Chevron deference to immigration 
adjudications since the very foundation of that framework.  
Although they advance an interesting contrarian thesis, the 
Professors ultimately provide no sound basis for retreating from 




 In a recent article, published as part of Duke Law Journal’s annual Administrative Law 
Symposium, Professors Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia and Christopher Walker argue that Chevron 
deference should not be applied to immigration adjudications, specifically, the decisions of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals in removal proceedings.1  This is a provocative thesis, contrary as 
it is to nearly four decades of federal court decisions, including repeated affirmations of Chevron’s 
applicability to immigration adjudications by the Supreme Court.  It is sure to prompt further 
debate in academia, as well as the federal courts, and to the extent it forces all interested parties to 




 Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Senior Litigation Counsel, United States Department 
of Justice, Civil Division, Office of Immigration Litigation.  The views and opinions expressed herein are the author’s 
own, and do not represent those of the Department of Justice or any component thereof. 
1 Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia & Christopher J. Walker, The Case Against Chevron Deference in Immigration 
Adjudication, 70 DUKE L.J. 1197 (2021). 
2 See, e.g., Amaya v. Rosen, 986 F.3d 424, 438 n.1 (4th Cir. 2021) (Richardson, J., dissenting) (noting the article and 
its argument for an agency’s ability to waive Chevron deference, while opining that in the absence of waiver Chevron 
must still be applied as a matter of precedent). 
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 If the article has a fundamental shortcoming, however, it is perspectival: the Professors 
write largely from outside the system they are critiquing.  That does not undercut the strength that 
many of their points carry, but it does provide an opening for a riposte from within the system.  
Having litigated the Chevron issue for the government in the immigration context before both the 
federal courts of appeals and the Supreme Court, my views differ significantly both in how the 
justifications for deference are framed and with the bottom-line conclusion that adjudications 
should categorically be denied deference.  On my account, I would place significant weight on 
Congress’s delegations to the Attorney General in the Immigration and Nationality Act and the 
background principle of plenary power, which may be weakened in its contemporary form but is 
far from dead.  Even assuming deference must be justified with resort to principles beyond 
Congress’s explicit delegations, immigration adjudications pass that bar: such adjudications are 
the poster-child for political accountability, as the Attorney General sits at the apex of the 
adjudicatory bureaucracy, and the agency possesses both the craft and legislative expertise that the 
Professors view as integral to the agency’s decision-making process.  Finally, it is important to 
note that rule-making—the Professors’ preferred avenue for immigration policy-making—and 
adjudication often serve different purposes, a point with special importance under the INA, a 
statute that makes clear those circumstances where Congress mandated rulemaking and those 
where the agency has a freer hand to chose the method for implementing policy.  The agency 
should be entitled to deference regardless of the path it choses, so long as its decision is otherwise 
reasonable. 
 
 Part I begins by placing the Chevron issue in context.  Although the immigration 
bureaucracy is a sprawling system of adjudication encompassing hundreds of thousands of 
adjudications each year before both immigration judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals, 
Chevron deference is concerned with a vanishingly small minority of cases.  And in that small 
minority of cases, the decision-making of the Board is robust and comprehensive.  Part II then 
proceeds to the meat of the issue, arguing for why Chevron deference to immigration adjudications 
is appropriate.  This section addresses the main points already highlighted above: the explicit 
general and specific statutory delegations to the Attorney General and the background principle of 
the Executive Branch’s plenary power in immigration; the political accountability in immigration 
adjudication via the Attorney General’s referral authority; and the significant institutional expertise 
the Board brings to bear in resolving cases through precedent-setting adjudications.  Finally, Part 
III argues that there is no substantial reason to prefer rulemaking to adjudication when it comes to 
affording deference to the agency’s determinations, while highlighting the complementary roles 
each often plays in the development and promulgation of policy. 
 
I. PLACING CHEVRON IN CONTEXT: IMMIGRATION ADJUDICATIONS AND THE BOARD OF 
IMMIGRATION APPEALS’ DECISIONAL PROCESS 
 
 Professors Wadhia and Walker lay out at some length the structure of the immigration 
adjudicatory system and its operational realities.  Rather than retread that ground, it is worthwhile 
to address two additional points that are especially relevant for addressing the Chevron question: 
the scope of Chevron’s potential applicability to immigration adjudications, and the decisional 




 First, Chevron’s potential scope.  The immigration adjudication system is massive, 
encompassing 65 immigration courts and 529 immigration judges,3 as well as the Board of 
Immigration Appeals, an appellate body that now has 23 permanent members.4  In 2020, 
immigration courts received 367,038 new cases, completed 231,435, and ended the year with a 
backlog of 1,256,954 cases.5  In the same year, the Board received 51,266 new appeals, resolved 
33,973 appeals, and ended the year with 84,716 appeals pending.6  Such a high workload may, 
from a 30,000 foot view, lend credence at the threshold to an argument that deference is not 
appropriate to immigration adjudications.  Professor Wadhia and Walker hint at this argument 
throughout their article, noting not only high case loads but also certain variances in case outcomes 
based on which immigration court is conducting the proceeding and whether the alien is 
represented.7  These factors may undercut the contention that deference is warranted, because they 
point to a system that is incapable of engaging in the type of reasoned adjudication that should 
undergird a decision claiming entitlement to deference.8 
 
 For that reason, it is worthwhile drilling down through the system to focus on that narrow 
class of decisions—out of the hundreds of thousands of cases that will be resolved by immigration 
judges and the Board in any given year—for which the question of Chevron deference would be a 
live issue.  Deference applies only when the adjudicator “acts in its lawmaking capacity and, in 
the case of the BIA’s adjudications, that means only when the BIA’s decision is binding precedent 
within the agency.”9  The Board’s decision is binding as precedent only in circumstances where 
the Board issues a published decision,10 and that occurs only rarely in any given year.  In 2020, 
the Board issued 25 precedential decisions, a number on par with its average yearly output over 
the last eight years: 16 (2019), 23 (2018), 27 (2017), 26 (2016), 28 (2015), 29 (2014), 19 (2013).  
It is this narrow class of cases alone—representing .07% of the total decisions issued in 2020—
that is relevant for Chevron purposes, as it is only this class of case that falls under the scope of 
Section 1003.1(g).  But even this calculation overstates the universe of cases to which the 
government may ultimately seek deference.  Although the Board may issue a precedential decision 
on any issue, and although that decision will bind agency adjudicators in the discharge of their 
responsibilities, many of these cases will not be entitled to deference before the courts of appeals.  
For instance, in many cases the Board decides on the divisibility of state criminal statutes or 
 
3 See EOIR Immigration Court Listing, Immigration Courts, available at https://www.justice.gov/eoir/immigration-
court-administrative-control-list (last visited Mar. 16, 2021); Executive Office for Immigration Review, Adjudication 
Statistics, Immigration Judge (IJ) Hiring (Jan. 2021), available at 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1242156/download (last visited Mar. 16, 2021). 
4 See Executive Office for Immigration Review, Board of Immigration Appeals, available at 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals-bios (last visited Mar. 16, 2021).  
5 See Executive Office for Immigration Review, Adjudication Statistics, Pending Cases, New Cases, and Total 
Completions (Jan. 7, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1242166/download (last visited Mar. 
16, 2021). 
6 See Executive Office for Immigration Review, Adjudication Statistics, Case Appeals Filed, Completed, and Pending 
(Jan. 7, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1248501/download (last visited Mar. 16, 2021). 
7 See, e.g., Wadhia & Walker, supra note 1, at 1228-30. 
8 See ibid. 
9 Flores-Molina v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1150, 1157 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting Rangel-Perez v. Lynch, 816 F.3d 591, 597 
(10th Cir. 2017)). 
10 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g). 
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whether such a statute is a categorical match to the generic federal offense,11 the decision will not 
be entitled to deference before the courts of appeals even though the decision is a precedential 
decision that binds agency adjudicators.  This is because the Board is held to have no particular 
expertise on state criminal laws, and because the categorical approach implicates a legal analysis 
to which deference is not relevant.12  For present purposes, it is enough to note that the universe 
of Chevron-eligible decisions in the immigration context is exceedingly narrow, and implicates 
less than one-tenth of one percent of all Board decisions issued in any given year. 
 
 Second, a corollary of the first point, the decisional-process undergirding the issuance of a 
precedential decision is more intensive and deliberative than issuance of single-member decisions.  
Precedential decisions are only issued in cases where the Board has sat as a three-member panel 
or en banc, and the decision may only be issued as a precedent where the entire Board membership 
discusses the case and votes in the affirmative to issue it as such.13  In this sense, every Board 
decision is essentially en banc—no precedent issues unless a majority of the Board members 
believes it should be so issued.  In this way, the work of the Board parallels that of the federal 
courts of appeals.  The Ninth Circuit may issue only a handful of precedential decisions in any 
given week, while issuing 100 unpublished memorandum dispositions.14  Nobody would allege 
that a published opinion issued by the Ninth Circuit is somehow lacking in relative deliberative 
processes just because the court also issued 20 or more unpublished decisions the same day.  What 
matters for assessing the adequacy of deliberation is the case at issue, and for the Board and 
Chevron purposes that relates only to the vanishingly small number of precedential decisions it 
issues in a year, not the thousands of other orders and decisions it will reach. 
 
II. THE CASE FOR CHEVRON DEFERENCE 
 
 When a court is confronted with an issue resolved by the Board in a precedential decision, 
it should afford deference to that resolution under familiar principles of Chevron deference.  This 
deference stems from the statute’s own explicit delegations to the Attorney General, and the 
comparative expertise and political accountability the agency enjoys in the course of discharging 
its adjudicatory functions.  Although Professors Wadhia and Walker attempt to cast doubt on the 
legitimacy of these justifications for deference in the immigration context, their arguments are 
ultimately misguided. 
 
11 See, e.g. Matter of Nemis, 28 I. & N. Dec. 250 (BIA 2021) (regarding application of the categorical approach to the 
federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, and a visa-fraud provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a)); Matter of Dikhtyar, 28 
I. & N. Dec. 214 (BIA 2021) (addressing the divisibility of the Utah state drug schedules by specific controlled 
substance); Matter of P-B-B-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 43 (BIA 2020) (similar, with regard to Arizona’s criminalization of 
possession of a “dangerous drug”). 
12 See, e.g., Omargharib v. Holder, 775 F.3d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 2014) (“Although we generally defer to the BIA’s 
interpretations of the INA, where, as here, the BIA construes statutes [and state law] over which it has no particular 
expertise, its interpretations are not entitled to deference.” (alterations in original) (quoting Karimi v. Holder, 715 F.3d 
561, 566 (4th Cir. 2013))); Ramos v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 709 F.3d 1066, 1069 n.2 (11th Cir. 2013) (“We own no Chevron 
deference to the Board’s interpretation of the Georgia [criminal] statute, which the Board has no power to 
administer.”); Denis v. Att’y Gen., 633 F.3d 201, 208 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[I]f the issue turns on the meaning of a federal 
statute other than the INA, we possess the requisite expertise to interpret a federal criminal statute such that no 
deference is due.”).  
13 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g). 
14 For March 15, 2021, for instance, the Ninth Circuit issued 21 unpublished decisions and 3 published decisions.  On 




A. Explicit Delegations and Structural Cues 
 
 The “statutory” case for Chevron deference in immigration adjudications is simple and 
straightforward, and has been recognized by the Supreme Court since its earliest consideration of 
the issue.  In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, the Court recognized that although there will still be strictly 
legal questions to which deference will not apply, there are also statutory ambiguities in the INA 
“which can only be given concrete meaning through a process of case-by-case adjudication.  In 
that process of filling any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress, the courts must respect 
the interpretation of the agency to which Congress has delegated the responsibility for 
administering the statutory program.”15  The Court clarified its rationale for applying Chevron to 
immigration adjudications in INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre.16  Given that the INA explicitly provided 
that the “determination and ruling by the Attorney General with respect to all questions of law 
shall be controlling,”17 the Court deemed it “clear that principles of Chevron deference are 
applicable” to immigration adjudications.18  In Aguirre-Aguirre, the Court found further support 
in the statute’s specific conferral of “decisionmaking authority on the Attorney General” in 
determining an alien’s eligibility for withholding of removal,19 as well as its prior recognition “that 
judicial deference to the Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the immigration context 
where officials ‘exercise especially sensitive political functions that implicate questions of foreign 
relations.’”20 
 
 These latter two points should be emphasized.  First, the statute broadly provides authority 
to the Attorney General to interpret the statute he is charged with administering, while containing 
numerous other delegations of decisional authority akin to what the Supreme Court found 
compelling in Aguirre-Aguirre, including provisions relating to: asylum, cancellation of removal, 
adjustment of status, and numerous other waivers and additional forms of relief or protection from 
removal.21  In other words, the INA is not a statute where courts must discern whether there is an 
implied or implicit delegation of authority to resolve statutory ambiguity; Congress has provided 
its explicit instruction that the Attorney General’s determinations, made in the course of 
discharging his responsibilities and decision-making authority under the INA, should be given 
“controlling” weight.22 
 
Second, judicial deference in the immigration context must be placed within the history of 
Executive authority over immigration; the Executive’s authority stems not only from the statutory 
scheme, but constitutes a background principle inherent in the nature of immigration law.  In 1950, 
the Supreme Court noted that “[w]hen Congress prescribes a procedure concerning the 
admissibility of aliens, it is not dealing alone with a legislative power.  It is implementing an 
 
15 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
16 526 U.S. 415 (1999). 
17 See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1). 
18 Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424. 
19 Id. at 424-25. 
20 Id. at 425 (quoting INS v. Abudu. 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988)). 
21 See Patrick J. Glen, Interring the Immigration Rule of Lenity, ** NEB. L. REV. **, at ** & n.191 (2021). 
22 See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (“We have recognized a very good indicator of 
delegation meriting Chevron treatment in express congressional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking 
or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed.”). 
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inherent executive power.”23  In Fiallo v. Bell, the Supreme Court opined that its cases “have long 
recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by 
the Government’s political department largely immune from judicial control.”24  This simply 
restated what it had said a year earlier in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong: “the power over aliens is of 
a political character and therefore subject only to narrow judicial review.”25  For this reason, the 
Supreme Court has traditionally, and even still, extended broad deference to the Executive’s 
immigration-related decisions because of the specific context of immigration law. 
 
Beyond these principles, subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court have focused on the 
specific expertise of the agency in resolving complicated issues of immigration law, as well as the 
policy-oriented disposition of certain issues that permissibly rests with the agency.  For instance, 
Justice Kagan recently described an immigration case as “the kind of case Chevron was built for.  
Whatever Congress might have meant . . . it failed to speak clearly.  Confronted with a self-
contradictory, ambiguous provision in a complex statutory scheme, the Board chose a textually 
reasonable construction consonant with its view of the purposes and policies underlying 
immigration law.”26  And in the related context of the ordinary-remand-rule, the Court has 
appealed to agency expertise in interpreting ambiguous provisions as a rationale for remanding to 
the agency rather than a court of appeals addressing legal or statutory interpretation questions in 
the first instance.27 
 
This history provides a firm foundation for Chevron’s application.  Congress has explicitly 
delegated authority to the Attorney General, including to conduct adjudications under the INA, 
and this delegation bolsters an inherent Executive authority in the immigration context.  Add to 
that the expertise the agency has in its sole subject matter focus, and it is little wonder that 
deference has been applied to immigration decisions continually since the advent of Chevron.  
 
B. Political Accountability and Attorney General Referral 
 
 Immigration adjudication, perhaps more than any other form of contemporary agency 
adjudication, offers exactly the type of political accountability that should underpin Chevron 
deference.  The Professors argue that two types of political accountability should be relevant for 
administrative purposes, an “elections matter” conception that advances the “electoral 
 
23 United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) (emphasis added). 
24 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (citation omitted). 
25 426 U.S. 88, 101 n.21 (1976) (citation omitted) 
26 Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 573 U.S. 41, 75 (2014) (plurality op.). 
27 See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 523 (2009) (“This remand rule exists, in part, because ‘ambiguities in statutes 
within an agency’s jurisdiction to administer are delegations of authority to the agency to fill the statutory gap in 
reasonable fashion.  Filling these gaps . . . involves difficult policy choices that agencies are better equipped to make 
than courts.’”) (citation omitted); id. at 524 (on remand, “[t]he agency’s interpretation of the statutory meaning of 
‘persecution’ may be explained by a more comprehensive definition, one designed to elaborate on the term in 
anticipation of a wide range of potential conduct; and that expanded definition in turn may be influenced by how 
practical, or impractical, the standard would be in terms of its application to specific cases.  These matters may have 
relevance in determining whether its statutory interpretation is a permissible one.”); see also Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 
U.S. 183, 186-87 (2006) (per curiam) (on remand, “‘[t]he agency can bring its expertise to bear upon the matter; it 
can evaluate the evidence; it can make an initial determination; and, in doing so, it can, through informed discussion 
and analysis, help a court later determine whether its decision exceeds the leeway that the law provides.’”) (quoting 
INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 17 (2002) (per curiam)). 
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accountability in the administrative state,” and a “deliberative accountability” that is centered on 
participatory goals.28  The Professors only conclusorily assert that “[p]olicymaking through 
adjudication may not be an adequate substitute for rulemaking under an ‘elections matter’ 
accountability theory,” seemingly basing this contention on a comparison of adjudication versus 
rulemaking rather than the inherent lack of political accountability in immigration adjudication.29  
Regarding deliberative shortcomings, they rely on purported shortcomings in the decisional 
process of the Attorney General on review.  I think the Professors’ concerns are overblown, and 
that political accountability is certainly present in the immigration system. 
 
 The Attorney General is, under the text of the statute, the chief administrator of the INA.30  
The Board acts only as his delegate, and only within the context in which he has delegated his 
authority to the Board to act.31  As the Attorney General’s delegate, the Board must still exercise 
its own independent judgment,32 and its decisions are deemed its own and not attributable to the 
Attorney General.33  Moreover, a corollary to the regulatory requirement that the Board’s decisions 
are a reflection of its own independent judgment, the Attorney General may not attempt to 
influence or dictate the decisions of the Board.34  But the regulations do safeguard the Attorney 
General’s fundamental role in immigration adjudication, by permitting him to decide cases he opts 
to refer to himself, or in which the Board or the Department of Homeland Security requests his 
review.35  Through exercise of this authority, “the Attorney General is the final arbiter of the 
immigration agency’s interpretation of a statute[.]”36 
 
 Exercise of this authority fits squarely with an “elections matter” conception of Executive 
Branch accountability.  The Trump Administration Attorneys General utilized the authority to 
implement an immigration policy that tracked with what the campaign promised it would do, a 
policy implementation that followed the election returns.37  Likewise, I have recently argued that 
 
28 See Wadhia & Walker, supra note 1, at 1231-32 (citations omitted). 
29 See ibid. 
30 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1103(a), 1103(g). 
31 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1) (“The Board shall function as an appellate body charged with the review of those 
administrative adjudications under the Act that the Attorney General may by regulation assign to it.”); see also 5 Fed. 
Reg. 2454 (July 1, 1940) (“the Board of Review of the Immigration and Naturalization Service shall have authority to 
exercise the powers of the Attorney General” in certain delineated cases). 
32 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) (“Subject to these governing standards, Board members shall exercise their 
independent judgment and discretion in considering and determining the cases coming before the Board, and a panel 
or Board member to whom a case is assigned may take any action consistent with their authorities under the Act and 
the regulations as is appropriate and necessary for the disposition of the case.”) . 
33 See Tefel v. Reno, 972 F.Supp. 608, 613 n.1 (S.D. Fl. 1997) (“the decision of the BIA is not factually, nor legally, 
the decision of the Attorney General”). 
34 See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1954) (“In unequivocal terms the 
regulations delegate to the Board discretionary authority as broad as the statute confers on the Attorney General; the 
scope of the Attorney General’s discretion became the yardstick of the Board’s.  And if the word ‘discretion’ means 
anything is a statutory or administrative grant of power, it means that the recipient must exercise his authority 
according to his own understanding and conscience.  This applies with equal force to the Board and the Attorney 
General.  In short, as long as the regulations remain operative, the Attorney General denies himself the right to sidestep 
the Board or dictate its decision in any manner.”). 
35 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h). 
36 Sanchez-Penunuri v. Longshore, 7 F.Supp.2d 1136, 1149 (D.Colo. 2013). 
37 See Patrick J. Glen, Robert F. Kennedy and the Attorney General’s Referral Authority: A Blueprint for the Biden 
Administration, ** HOFSTRA L. REV. ** (2021). 
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the Biden Administration should utilize the authority to implement its preferred immigration 
policy within the limits the authority permits.38 
 
 Other Attorneys General have also utilized the referral authority in a manner that squares 
with this aspect of the political accountability theory.  A few examples: Attorneys General in the 
Reagan and Bush Administrations referred the deportation case of a United Kingdom citizen based 
on foreign policy concerns and the impact on the U.S.-U.K. relationship;39 Attorney General Reno 
referred the Board’s decision in Matter of R-A-, rejecting the claim of an asylum applicant that 
victims of domestic violence constitute a “particular social group,” based on the concerns of 
advocates which had also led the Clinton Administration to propose rule-making on the same 
issue;40 Attorney General Mukasey referred a decision on female genital mutilation and reversed 
the Board’s restrictive opinion after an outcry from advocates and direct pleas by lawmakers and 
advocates to intervene;41 and Attorney General Holder referred a same-sex civil union case and 
remanded for further proceedings amid the Obama Administration’s deliberations over whether to 
continue defending the Defense Of Marriage Act.42  This list is not exhaustive,43 but it does 
establish the Attorney General as the final arbiter in immigration proceedings when necessary to 
take into account potential political ramifications of the decision.  That it does not happen more 
often does not point to a lack of political accountability in immigration adjudication, but to the fact 
that that adjudication—unlike other areas of administrative law—rarely implicates questions that 
would place the need for political accountability front and center. 
 
 In the course of conducting these adjudications, the Attorney General also far more often 
than not (almost invariably, in fact) meets the conditions under the “deliberative democracy” 
conception of political accountability.  When the Attorney General accepts a case on referral, 
briefing from the parties is normally contemplated, and immigration advocates have usually been 
invited to participate as amicus, as well.44  This is not a regulatory requirement, nor does every 
case elicit a request for responses from the parties.  But in those cases where such briefs are 
solicited (the overwhelming majority), it is difficult to see why that public invitation and the 
briefing it may prompt is substantially less important from a participatory point of view than the 
publication of a proposed rule with its own invitation for comments.  This process also has 
 
38 See generally id. 
39 See Deportation Proceedings for Joseph Patrick Thomas Doherty, 13 Op. O.L.C. 1 (1989); Deportation Proceedings 
of Joseph Patrick Thomas Doherty, 12 Op. O.L.C. 1 (1988); see also Alberto R. Gonzales & Patrick Glen, Advancing 
Executive Branch Immigration Policy Through the Attorney General’s Review Authority, 101 IOWA L. REV. 841, 882-
86 (2016). 
40 See Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (AG 2001); see also Gonzales & Glen, supra note 39, at 886-89. 
41 See Matter of A-T-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 617 (AG 2008); see also Gonzales & Glen, supra note 39, at 861-63. 
42 See Matter of Dorman, 25 I. & N. Dec. 485 (AG 2011); see also Glen, supra note 37, at *****. 
43 For more on the history of Attorney General decisions, see generally Gonzales & Glen, supra note 39 (focusing on 
decisions issued in the Bush II and Obama Administrations, with reference to additional decisions in the Reagan, Bush 
I, and Clinton Administrations); Glen, supra note 37 (addressing the decisions issued during the Kennedy, Clinton, 
and Obama Administrations). 
44 See Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 187 (AG 2018) (referring the case, directing briefing on specific issues, 
and inviting “interested amici to submit briefs”); Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 227 (AG 2018) (same); Matter of 
L-A-B-R-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 245 (AG 2018) (same); Matter of M-G-G-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 469 (AG 2018) (same); Matter 
of M-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 476 (AG 2018) (same); Matter of Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. 481 (AG 2018) (same); Matter 
of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 494 (AG 2018) (same); Matter of Castillo-Perez, 27 I. & N. Dec. 495 (AG 2018) (same); 
Matter of Thomas & Thompson, 27 I. & N. Dec. 556 (AG 2019) (same); Matter of Reyes, 27 I. & N. Dec. 708 (AG 
2019) (same); Matter of A-M-R-C-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 7 (AG 2020) (same). 
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sufficient transparency.  The public is not privy to the decision-making process of the Attorney 
General in the course of rendering his decision on a referred case, but neither is it privy to the 
consideration of submitted comments and what responses they may trigger from the interested 
agencies engaged in a rule-making.  In both cases, the public does see the final result—the Attorney 
General’s decision with arguments accepted or rejected and the reasoning for the relevant 
determinations, and the Final Rule with comments noted and the agencies’ response 
memorialized—but in neither is there any significant transparency concerning how the agency 
arrived at that final determination. 
 
C. The Expertise of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
 
 The Professors also fault the agency for a lack of relevant “expertise” for Chevron 
purposes.45  Although there is some force to aspects of their argument—scientific knowledge and 
expertise may be entirely lacking in the immigration context, while technical expertise, too, may 
be less important than in other areas—other aspects seem incomplete or wrong.  Here, I deal with 
two issues: the concept of “legislative expertise,” which in my (perhaps idiosyncratic) conception 
the Board does possess, and “craft expertise,” which, given the case flows through the agency, the 
Board could be expected to have in spades.46 
 
 First, the Professors argue that the Board lacks “[l]egislative [e]xpertise,” defined as “the 
expertise derived from the principal-agent relationship between Congress and the agency.”47  The 
Professors contend that “[t]his specialized knowledge of legislative purpose and process should 
only matter, from a Chevron-expertise perspective, if the agency statutory interpreter possesses 
that expertise—either directly because the interpreter helped draft the statute or indirectly because 
the interpreter interacts with the agency personnel who possess that expertise[.]”48  There is no 
question that Board members do not themselves assist with the drafting or review of legislation, 
and no reason to believe they have any interactions with agency personnel that do, so in one sense 
there is force to the Professors’ argument. 
 
 But I believe the concept of “legislative expertise” is given too-narrow a definition in the 
Professors’ argument.  In a more fundamental sense, the Board does have important insights into 
relevant legislative policies and purposes, because immigration enactments have largely unfolded 
 
45 See Wadhia & Walker, supra note 1, at 1215-24. 
46 Although not a central focus of their argument, the Professors also argue that no “legal or policy expertise in 
immigration or foreign relations” is required to become a member of the Board.  See Wadhia & Walker, supra note 1, 
at 1217-19.  That is true in one sense, as a lack of such knowledge is not disqualifying, but untrue in another, as 
subject-matter expertise is an important part of the application process—a fact borne out by the complete job 
announcement that the Professors refer to only in part.  See Immigration Judge, 
https://www.usajobs.gov/Get/Job?viewDetails/570894500 (last accessed Feb. 16, 2021) (noting the requirement that 
applicants respond to the Quality Rating Factors, including “knowledge of immigration laws and procedures”).  It is 
also worth noting that new hires are tested prior to the commencement of adjudicatory activities, ensuring there is a 
baseline of subject-matter specific expertise.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0(b)(1)(vi).  Both Board members and immigration 
judges are required to undertake ongoing training “to promote the quality and consistency of adjudications[.]”  See 8 
C.F.R. §§ 1003.0(b)(1)(vii), 1003.1(a)(2)(i)(B).  And throughout their time as adjudicators, Board members are 
assessed and evaluated to ensure they are properly discharging the functions of the office.  See 8 C.F.R. §§ 
1003.0(b)(1)(vi), 1003.1(a)(2)(i)(D). 
47 See Wadhia & Walker, supra note 1, at 1221. 
48 Id. at 1222. 
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in the past three to four decades as a complicated case of action and reaction, with the Board and 
courts of appeals constituting the “action” and Congress providing the “reaction.”  The major 
amendments to the asylum statute made by the REAL ID Act of 2005, for instance, including new 
provisions relating to the burden of proof, credibility assessments, and corroboration requirements, 
were meant to codify existing Board standards as against contrary precedent in the Ninth Circuit.49  
Congress having looked to the Board itself for the statement of the proper standards, who better 
than the Board to interpret any gaps or ambiguities left in those provisions?  And, in fact, 
knowledge of this legislative background—the rules Congress wanted to reject and the policies it 
was interested in advancing—has informed the Board’s interpretation of these provisions, and 
produced exactly the type of decision that should qualify for deference under the terms of 
Chevron.50 
 
 The REAL ID Act is not an isolated instance, either.  In the Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA),51 Congress made numerous changes to the INA 
premised on issues that arose through administrative and federal litigation, including: amending 
the definition of conviction to adopt certain aspects of the Board’s prevailing definition, while 
rejecting others;52 eliminating suspension of deportation and replacing it with cancellation of 
removal, including a heightened hardship standard deemed necessary because of lax application 
of the prior “extreme hardship” standard;53 and clarifying certain issues relating to when a 
qualifying relationship must exist for purposes of certain waivers of inadmissibility.54  In other 
words, the base-line for many of the shifts in IIRIRA was Board precedent, and thus the Board is 
well-placed to understand: 1) what the prior rule was; 2) how Congress altered that rule; and 3) 
what that alteration means for purposes of a permissible interpretation going forward.55  This of 
course tracks quite nicely with the concept of “legislative experience” offered by the authors.  Their 
error, it seems to me, was reading that concept too narrowly to exclude the institutional knowledge 
the agency has by virtue of its central interpretive role in the relevant statutory scheme. 
 
 Second, the Professors posit the possibility that the Board may possess “craft expertise,” 
relying on the work of Professor Sidney Shapiro.56  Professor Shapiro advances a conception of 
 
49 See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-72, at 161-69 (2005). 
50 See, e.g., Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 516, 518-24 (BIA 2015) (interpreting the REAL ID Act’s corroboration 
requirement in light of its professed purpose of rejecting contrary court of appeals’ precedent and adopting the Board’s 
rule); Matter of C-T-L-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 341, 343-48 (BIA 2010) (similar, in regard to the REAL ID Act’s amendments 
to the statutory burden-of-proof provisions for asylum and withholding of removal). 
51 Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996). 
52 See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 828, at 223-24 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) (citing Matter of Esposito, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1 
(BIA 1995); Matter of Castro, 19 I. & N. Dec. 692 (BIA 1988); Matter of Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. 546 (BIA 1988)). 
53 Id. at 213-14 (citing Matter of O-J-O-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 381 (BIA 1996)); see Patrick J. Glen & Alanna R. Kennedy, 
The Strange and Unexpected Afterlife of Pereira v. Sessions, 34 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 10-12 (2019) (recounting 
changes to the discretionary-relief regime made by IIRIRA). 
54 Id. at 228 (citing Matter of Farias, 21 I. & N. Dec. 269 (BIA 1996)); see Glen, supra note 37, at ** (noting IIRIRA’s 
reversal of Matter of Farias); Gonzales & Glen, supra note 39, at 890 (same). 
55 See, e.g., Matter of Cardenas-Abreu, 24 I. & N. Dec. 795, 796-802 (BIA 2009) (en banc) (interpreting IIRIRA’s 
statutory enactment of a definition for the term “convicted” in light of pre-1996 Board and federal court precedent, as 
well as legislative intent); Matter of Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 58-63 (BIA 2001) (en banc) (interpreting 
the new “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” requirement for cancellation of removal in light of the prior 
suspension-of-deportation standard and evident congressional intent in heightening the various eligibility criteria for 
discretionary relief from removal in IIRIRA). 
56 See Wadhia & Walker, supra note 1, at 1217, 1223-24. 
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“institutional expertise,” tied to the “unique wisdom of [the] regulatory agency,” and ultimately 
premised on “experience” rather than “formal knowledge.”57  With tens of thousands of appeals 
resolved each year, the Board could be expected to possess “craft expertise” in spades, and in fact 
Professor Wadhia and Walker feint in that direction initially.58  Ultimately, they conclude that the 
issue of craft expertise does not weigh in the Board’s favor for two reasons: 1) statutory 
ambiguities in the INA rarely implicate the foundational issues of expertise relevant to the concept; 
and 2) even if the Board does possess some craft expertise, it is a lesser form of expertise compared 
to other agency actors in the rulemaking process.59 
 
 Fairly construed, the calculus seems to weigh in the other direction.  By dint of resolving 
tens of thousands of cases annually, presenting variations on a relatively firm set of themes, the 
Board does augment its understanding of the immigration laws generally, as well as how they 
specifically apply to certain circumstances.  Considering the concept of “particular social group” 
in the refugee definition, for instance, the Board may hone its understanding of the general concept 
as the issue is raised across a variety of circumstances, while also sharpening its application to 
specifics that may be presented over and over again.  By having to resolve the question 
continuously, the Board’s expertise as a general and specific matter begins to far outstrip other 
actors in the bureaucracy.  It may be true that some questions do not implicate technical or 
scientific expertise, but many, if not most, that are resolved through precedential decision-making 
will involve matters peculiar to the agency’s institutional mission, like the “particular social group” 
interpretation noted above.  In cases where the Board issues a precedential decision, that decision 
is likely the end product of having considered the issue in hundreds, thousands, or even tens of 
thousands of other cases, with the precedent-setting decision marking the culmination of this 
expansive decisional process.  Not only does the Board possess the institutional expertise posited 
by Professor Shapiro, because of the sheer breadth of its workload it is difficult to imagine an 
agency that could claim greater “craft expertise.” 
 
 The comparative expertise argument also seems weak.  The Professors do note that the 
focus of the Board on immigration issues and the stream of cases mean that the agency possesses 
greater comparative expertise than the federal courts.60  But there is little reason to believe that the 
Board does not also possess greater “craft expertise” than other agency experts.  Again tying this 
to work-flow, the Board will have seen a particular issue raised in virtually every possible 
circumstance in which it can be raised, giving it a more expansive view of the legal playing field 
than other experts tied solely to the language of the statute or legal imagination.  Given the number 
of cases decided by immigration judges, and the possibilities of the fully panoply of issues under 
the INA being appealed to the Board, it is the Board that has the most comprehensive view of 
immigration law of virtually any actor in the field.  The number of appeals considered and resolved 
each year, and the range of issues presented therein, dwarf the scope of rule-making.  In other 
words, if there is institutional expertise borne of practice, the Board can comfortably claim that 
mantle in the immigration context. 
 
 
57 Sidney A. Shapiro, The Failure to Understand Exerptise in Administrative Law: The Problem and the 
Consequences, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1097, 1099 (2015). 
58 See Wadhia & Walker, supra note 1, at 1223. 
59 Id. at 1223-24. 




III. RULE-MAKING VERSUS ADJUDICATION 
 
 The Professors’ arguments against Chevron deference to immigration adjudications are not 
free-standing attacks against the concept, but rather the framework they utilize to advance their 
main normative argument: that at least so far as immigration policy-making is concerned, the 
agencies should categorically prefer rule-making to adjudication.  For me, because I do not believe 
in the strength of their arguments against the applicability of Chevron deference to immigration 
adjudications, I remain at best agnostic about the choice between adjudication and rule-making.  
But I also believe that, even on its own terms, the Professors’ argument relies on an idealized 
conception of rule-making where, in reality, the purported gulf between the desirability of these 
options is substantially narrower (or non-existent). 
 
 At the threshold, there is no question—and the Professors do not argue to the contrary—
that when given the choice to proceed via rule-making or adjudication, the choice is entirely within 
the discretion of the agency.61  Likewise, under controlling precedent, deference is warranted in 
either case, so long as the agency is fulfilling its statutory mandate and Congress has not 
unambiguously foreclosed the interpretation or decision made by the agency.62  The provision of 
this choice makes sense, as some issues may be amendable to either rule-making or adjudication, 
for others there are considerations that may weigh more heavily in favor of the one rather than the 
other, and for still others the choice may be directed by statute or the nature of the policy question 
being resolved. 
 
 Using just the asylum statute as an example, all these dynamics can be seen at work.  The 
Attorney General may, “by regulation,” “designate offenses that will be considered to be” 
disqualifying particularly serious crimes or serious nonpolitical crimes for purposes of asylum 
eligibility,63 “may . . . establish additional limitations and conditions . . . under which an alien shall 
be ineligible for asylum,”64 and “may provide . . . other conditions or limitations on the 
consideration of an application for asylum[.]”65  He also “shall establish a procedure for the 
consideration of asylum applications filed under” the statute.66  These are issues that by their nature 
or by specific direction of the statute must be resolved via rule-making.  In contrast, the definition 
of “particular social group,” one of the statutorily protected grounds on which basis an alien may 
assert eligibility for asylum, is an issue that would be amenable to either rule-making or 
adjudication.  The Board has established broad criteria to consider in assessing whether a particular 
social group qualifies as such,67 but it is possible that such criteria could have been promulgated 
 
61 See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (“the choice made between proceeding by general rule 
or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency.”); 
see also F.C.C. v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 808 n.29 (1978) (“The Commission 
has substantial discretion as to whether to proceed by rulemaking or adjudication”) (citation omitted). 
62 See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (“We have recognized a very good indicator of 
delegation meriting Chevron treatment in express congressional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking 
or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed.”). 
63 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
64 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(C). 
65 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(5)(B). 
66 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(1). 
67 See Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (BIA 2014); Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208 (BIA 2014). 
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via regulation, as well.  No final rule on “particular social groups” has ever been promulgated, but 
the Clinton Administration did issue a draft rule that would have addressed some of these 
questions.68  In contrast with the initial examples in this paragraph, however, there is nothing about 
resolving the ambiguity inherent in the term “particular social group” that makes rule-making or 
adjudication the preferred course of action—policy could be established through either 
mechanism.  But then consider application of that generally promulgated framework to specific 
proposed social groups, whether it is victims of domestic abuse, the nuclear family, former gang 
members, or wealthy returning deportees.  Rule-making cannot exhaustively address each and 
every conceivable proposed social group, even if it could establish the parameters for considering 
when such a group could be recognized.69  Instead, adjudication, by considering each question on 
a case-by-case basis, can provide greater form and context for interpretation of the ambiguous 
term, and in so doing should be entitled to deference consistent with the Supreme Court’s direction 
in cases such as Cardoza-Fonseca and Aguirre-Aguirre.70 
 
 Presenting rule-making as an all-or-nothing option if an agency wants to obtain deference 
on review fails to take into account these differences inherent in the multitude of issues raised 
before and considered by agencies.  At the very least, failing to meaningfully grapple with these 
questions undercuts the force of the Professors adamant turn to rule-making in the immigration 
context.  To be sure, on one level the question is not the choice itself but the result of that choice, 
and even there the Professors’ argument resorts to the extension of some deference (just not 
Chevron).71  Regardless of these points, however, the end result is the same: for the agencies’ 
policy choices to receive the deference due them under Chevron, they must proceed through rule-
making to the exclusion of adjudication. 
 
 Despite the foregoing, the Professors’ Manichean approach might make sense if rule-
making were some sort panacea for all the ills they raise regarding immigration adjudication.  On 
a clear-eyed view, though, it is not.  The shortcomings of rule-making may be different in kind or 
scope than those of adjudication, but they are shortcomings nonetheless.  The concerns noted by 
the Professors ultimately provide no support for their aggressive argument in favor of rule-making. 
 
 Returning, first, to the question of expertise; in arguing against relevant expertise by agency 
adjudicators, the Professors framed that perceived lack against the greater benefits of expertise 
offered by other individuals within the subject agencies.72  The question of comparative expertise 
seems closer to a wash, however.  There are undoubtedly other experts at EOIR, DHS, and DOJ, 
who have meaningful contributions to make in the course of rule-making (as well as the antecedent 
 
68 See generally Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588 (Dec. 7, 2000). 
69 See Chenery, 332 U.S. at 202 (“Not every principle essential to the effective administration of a statute can or should 
be cast immediately into the mold of a general rule.  Some principles must await their own development, while others 
must be adjusted to meet particular, unforeseeable situations.  In performing its important functions in these respects, 
therefore, an administrative agency must be equipped to act either by general rule or by individual order.  To insist 
upon one form of action to the exclusion of the other is to exalt form over necessity.”). 
70 See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 448 (“There is obviously some ambiguity in a term like ‘well-founded fear’ 
which can only be given concrete meaning through a process of case-by-case adjudication.  In that process of filling 
any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress, the courts must respect the interpretation of the agency to which 
Congress has delegated the responsibility for administering the statutory program.”) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted); Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 425 (similar). 
71 See, e.g., Wadhia & Walker, supra note 1, at 1241. 
72 See generally id. at 1221-24. 
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step of statutory revision and drafting), but there is little reason to view any of these discrete experts 
as in possession of substantially more knowledge than the adjudicators and their adjutants.  
Regarding the aggregation of expertise, in the course of rule-making the agencies may benefit from 
multiple different viewpoints being brought to bear on a single problem—EOIR may be able to 
explain adjudicative issues posed by the rule, DHS operational impact, and DOJ potential litigation 
fall-out.73  Here, the benefits of rule-making in the abstract may seem formidable, but with any 
precedential decision the Board will have the views of its own expert members, the staff of EOIR 
who work for the Board, and the views of DHS via briefing and possibly argument.  The slate of 
experts available to the Board is certainly less than what would be available to the administration 
via rule-making, but this should also be considered within the scope of the decisions being 
rendered.  As explained above, issues that are peculiarly subject to adjudication are also 
substantially less likely to benefit from the kind of aggregation of expertise encouraged by the rule-
making process.  Interpreting the term “particular social group” is of a different kind of exercise 
than promulgating procedures to guide the filing and consideration of asylum applications.  The 
aggregation issue arises only through posing a false equivalency between issues considered in rule-
making and those considered in adjudication. 
 
 The nature of expertise is also a tricky concept in this area.  As I argue above, I believe that 
the Board has substantial institutional expertise that arises because of the impetus behind much of 
Congress’s reforms over the past decades.  Those reforms have occurred with Board precedent in 
mind, and thus the Board is peculiarly well-placed to understand what Congress was doing and 
why.  I also agree with the Professors, however, that others within the immigration bureaucracy 
may have important contributions to make regarding the same question.74  The Professors note in 
this regard the Board’s inability to access this expertise because of the Chinese wall between the 
adjudicator and other policy-makers,75 and use that fact as an argument against deference to the 
Board itself.  But if that wall is blocking a flow of information, it is blocking that flow from both 
directions.  The Board may not have access to other experts’ views, but then those same experts 
do not have access to the Board’s own expert views and what could be its singular insights into 
the motivating factors of statutory amendments.  Where the Professors see only a shortcoming 
insofar as the Board itself is concerned, I see a two-way street whereby experts engaged in rule-
making have only a limited universe of expertise to consider, while the Board itself has only a 
slightly differently constituted limited universe of expertise to consider.  Both procedures lack 
something, and given that—along with my more generally supportive views of Board expertise in 
the course of adjudication—I can find no expertise-based reason to categorically prefer rule-
making while withdrawing adjudication from the scope of Chevron deference. 
 
 Political accountability also seems more or less a wash.  Given the possibilities of Attorney 
General referral, adjudication via that avenue provides as much political accountability as does 
Executive agency rule-making.  In both cases, voters know where the buck has stopped.  I also 
disagree that rule-making is inherently preferable from the perspective of public participation.  
Here, the Professors are quite bullish on the benefits of rule-making, which seem superficially 
clear: a rule is proposed, the public is invited to review and comment, and the administration then 
considers the comments (sometimes in the hundreds of thousands) individually (!) and drafts a 
 





final rule taking into consideration all these concerns and comments.  The notion that this process 
is actually engaged in soliciting and considering public views to the ends of altering the agencies’ 
preferred rules is at best in tension with reality.  Writing in an earlier version of the Duke 
administrative law symposium, Professor E. Donald Elliott, formerly a Public Member of the 
Administrative Conference of the United States and Assistant Administrator and General Counsel 
of the Environmental Protection Agency, remarked that “[n]o administrator in Washington turns 
to full-scale notice-and-comment rulemaking when she is genuinely interested in obtaining input 
from interested parties.”76  No doubt informed by his own personal experience, Professor Elliott 
offered a telling simile: “Notice-and-comment rulemaking is to public participation as Japanese 
Kabuki theater is to human passions—a highly stylized process for displaying in a formal way the 
essence of something which in real life takes place in other venues.”77  This is not to say that rule-
making is not informed by public concerns as well as interested constituents, but only that that 
process is not likely to occur within the confines of rule-making itself.78  The notice-and-comment 
process is now quite formal and driven by compliance with statutory standards, and the bare-fact 
of meeting those standards (while also compiling the record on which the rule will be defended in 
the federal courts)—not “provid[ing] . . . public input into government thinking—is the 
“primary[]” function of the process.79 
 
 A comparison of those parties submitting comments to the prior administration in the 
immigration rule-making context would, I would wager, align highly with the interested amicus 
submitting briefs before the Attorney General in referred cases.  Professor Wadhia specifically has 
been an active amicus participant in immigration cases before the Supreme Court, federal courts 
of appeals, and district courts.  Why is the latter form of participation dramatically different from 
the former?  The Professors do not pose this question and thus do not answer it, but it is worth 
considering.  If the essence of the public-participation argument is the ability to be heard, the 
opportunities are similar as between rule-making and adjudication in that narrow class of case that 
will prompt a decision entitled to deference on review.  The opportunities are not identical, and I 
do not mean to argue to the contrary—the Board and Attorney General may decide cases without 
amicus participation or additional briefing from the parties.  But fairly considered, the 
opportunities to participate in those adjudications that will lead to a precedential decision are more 
robust and important than the Professors acknowledge, while their own preferred course of rule-
making contains only a formalized mechanism of public participation whose actual substantive 
importance is open to debate. 
 
 All this is to say only that rule-making has its own warts.  It is a necessary mechanism for 
adopting certain policies, and the route that should be preferred in other classes of cases, as well.  
But it is not without its own shortcomings, including as to expertise, accountability, and 
participation, and the Professors fail to advance any compelling reason for categorically preferring 
rule-making to adjudication in the advancement of administration policy, much less an argument 
 
76 E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492 (1992). 
77 Ibid. 
78 Id. at 1492-93 (“To secure the genuine reality, rather than a formal show, of public participation, a variety of 
techniques is available—from informal meetings with trade associations and other constituency groups, to 
roundtables, to floating ‘trial balloons’ in speeches or leaks to the trade press, to the more formal techniques of 
advisory committees and negotiated rulemaking.”). 
79 Id. at 1493. 
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for why we should continue to confer deference on rule-makings while withdrawing it from 
adjudications. 
IV. RESPONSIBILITY FOR, AND THE LIKELY OUTCOME OF, CHEVRON’S RECALIBRATION 
 
 This leaves possibilities for reform—assuming Chevron should be recalibrated for 
purposes of immigration adjudication, how should that recalibration be accomplished?  First, if 
Congress wants to eliminate deference for all administrative cases or any subset thereof, there is 
no obvious impediment to that action, although I share the Professors’ skepticism that any 
substantial reform to deference principles will come through legislation.80  The Professors do note 
the possibility of comprehensive immigration reform in the Biden Administration, and this well 
may provide an avenue to action on the specific question of deference.  But it additionally opens 
the door to other ways to cut-back on the circumstances where such deference is relevant—revising 
the INA or enacting new provisions that more particularly and explicitly address the relevant 
questions rather than more open-ended provisions leaving interpretive discretion with the agency.  
Eliminating or cutting-back on the chances an agency would have to render an interpretation 
ultimately entitled to deference before the federal courts is as wise a move towards “mitigating” 
deference’s reign as would be a wholesale revocation of deference. 
 
 Second, perhaps most provocatively, the Professors argue for the Executive Branch to take 
the lead by waiving deference in immigration adjudications and “shifting major immigration 
policymaking away from adjudication and into the realm of notice-and-comment rulemaking.”81  
For support, they note a recent regulation limiting the circumstances where the Department of 
Justice will seek deference in the wake of Kisor v. Wilkie’s reconceptualization of Auer 
deference.82  I would assume there is no barrier to the Department also doing so in the context of 
Chevron deference and defense of immigration adjudications.  But the Professors miss an 
important point in citing this regulation—the Department sought to ensure that its litigation 
unfolded consistent with governing Supreme Court law, and did not push the boundaries by asking 
for deference to guidance and internal documents that otherwise would not warrant deference.  
That argument is entirely lacking here—the Supreme Court has consistently and emphatically 
described immigration adjudication as entitled to deference on judicial review.  In promulgating 
any contrary Departmental policy or rule, the Department would not be acting to ensure 
compliance with Supreme Court law, but would be itself catalyzing a shift away from that law. 
 
This also implicates attorney-client obligations.  The Department’s lawyers have higher 
obligations and duties regarding the rule of law than private practitioners.83  This means that in 
certain circumstances, the Department will decline to defend otherwise favorable precedent or may 
 
80 See Wadhia & Walker, supra note 1, at 1236. 
81 Id. at 1241. 
82 Ibid. (citing Processes and Procedures for Issuance and Use of Guidance Documents, 85 Fed. Reg. 63,200 (Oct. 7, 
2020)). 
83 See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (“The United States Attorney is the representative not of 
an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its 
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but 
that justice shall be done.”); see also United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 25 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting 
that the Supreme Court has “long emphasized that a representative of the United States Government is held to a higher 
standard of behavior” than private counsel). 
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confess error.84  Along with this obligation, however, is the obligation to defend our client-agencies 
within the limits permitted by the law.85  The limits of the law obviously entail not stretching the 
text of statutes, regulations, or judicial precedent beyond their reasonable import, but there can be 
no colorable argument that those limits also entail voluntarily declining to seek deference in a class 
of adjudications that the Supreme Court has repeatedly told us warrant deference.  If Chevron 
continues to exist, and its application to immigration adjudications continues to be sanctioned, 
there is no legal rationale to support the Department’s waiver of deference, and any institutional 
interests are purely hypothetical.86 
 
Most importantly, however, voluntary abdication of deference takes the burden off the 
entity that should be charged with rethinking the scope of Chevron: the Supreme Court itself.  
Deference, as currently conceptualized, stems from Supreme Court precedent and is a canon 
applicable to judicial review of agency action.  It is thus with the judiciary that the mantle of reform 
must ultimately rest.  Unless or until the Court seeks to alter the deference calculus, the Executive 
is entitled to continue to argue for deference consistent with that precedent.  And, of course, this 
may already be happening in immigration cases.  Former Justice Kennedy criticized the courts of 
appeals reflexive recourse to deference in a recent immigration case, where Justice Alito, in his 
solo dissent, argued that the majority’s decision was an implicit repudiation of Chevron 
deference.87  The Court has also declined to take a position on whether deference is warranted to 
immigration adjudications that touch on so-called dual-use statutes, statutes that may entail both 
civil and criminal consequences, instead conducting de novo review of the question presented.88  
Of course, in the midst of these cases, the Court has continued to apply Chevron deference.89  But 
to the extent there are increasingly cases where the Court balks at that application, any necessary 
recalibration is likely already underway. 
 
It is also important to address a question the Professors do not raise—what is the practical 
effect if immigration adjudications no longer qualify for Chevron deference?  Presumably, the 
Professors would argue that the elimination of deference would be of significant importance, 
otherwise there would be little reason to spend 47 pages arguing for that result in a prestigious law 
journal.  I am skeptical.  In the Supreme Court itself, I see little reason to believe that a lack of 
deference will negatively affect the rate at which the government prevails.  First, again, many cases 
 
84 This obviously happens infrequently, and when it does happen the issue is usually not a substantive interpretation 
of the agency but a jurisdictional determination by the court of appeals.  See Mata v. Lynch, 576 U.S. 143, 147 (2015) 
(noting government’s agreement with the petitioner contra the holding of the court of appeals); Kucana v. Holder, 558 
U.S. 233, 241-42 (2010) (same); see also Abdisalan v. Holder, 774 F.3d 517, 523 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (noting 
the confluence of the petitioner’s and government’s argument on rehearing). 
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are already resolved without recourse to Chevron.  Second, the cases where Chevron was applied 
were not likely to have come out the other way absent a robust conception of deference.  The issue 
may be more complicated in the courts of appeals, but the Professors certainly do not make any 
substantial case for a sea-change in judicial review of immigration adjudications in a hypothetical 
post-Chevron world.  The points regarding the Supreme Court are likely to be just as important in 
the courts of appeals, i.e., many cases are already disposed of on non-deference-related grounds, 
while a “better-reading” argument will often favor the position advanced by the government even 
in the absence of Chevron deference (whether on de novo review or on application of Skidmore 
“deference”).  Of course, this may just provide fuel for their argument—if the outcome will not 
have catastrophic consequences on the adjudicatory system, why not jettison deference and give a 
freer hand to the courts of appeals?  That would be a rational counterpunch.  For me, however, it 
argues for maintenance of the status quo, especially in these circumstances where I think most of 





 Professors Wadhia and Walker have written a thoughtful critique of the application of 
Chevron deference to immigration adjudications, but for me it ultimately misses the mark.  In some 
sense I have a dog in this fight, although my interests are more institutional than substantive.  The 
actual practice of deference in immigration litigation has not engendered any significant problems 
in the four decades since Chevron, and unreasonable decisions or those prohibited by the plain 
language of the statute will be vacated on review.  But where there is ambiguity or room for the 
agency to make a policy choice, it is entitled to pursue that decision through adjudication.  And 
having done so, the courts should defer under the long-accepted principles of Chevron. 
